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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPF \ I 
STATE OF UTAH 
n.Li-\NOR HI lit \\IM\ ami 
Appellees, 
vs. 
A-t.HlU'K'ITNl! LOANS, INC, 
BRIEF OF THE APPEI JLEE 
Case No: 20040367CA 
Appellant, 
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPEI I VII ,11IKISDU'' 11 i N 
The Court does not have jurisdiction for this appeal based upon the fact that a 
Nodic ol Appeal was. nul etileiei! (MIII l!a»" Imul Judgment imposing sanctions. The 
Appellant failed to file a timely appeal based upon Rule \ ul lln o) I/7'WAJM' 
hire and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Appellant filed a 
o >ei UMvie Uiv -moment, which is the only basis for appeal, alter the time for 
appeal expired. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW THE STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
AND CITATIONS 
1. THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL 
TO CLEARLY SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING HIS CASE AFTER FAILING TO ARRANGE A MEETING OR 
ARRANGE A MEETING AS DIRECTED BY COURT ORDER. 
Standard of review: On appeal the Appellate Court will give the Trial Court 
broad discretion and will not disturb the lower Court's decision absent an abuse of 
discretion and a likelihood that an injustice occurred." Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 
888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and Winward v. Carlos, 2003 UT App 418 
(Utah App. 12/04/2003). 
2. THE APPELLANT AS A PARTY TO THE ACTION WHEN THE FINAL 
ORDER STRIKING THE ANSWER AND AWARDING RELIEF TO THE 
APPELLEE FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL AND INSTEAD 
ALLOWED THE TIME FOR APPEAL TO EXPIRE BEFORE FILING A RULE 
60B MOTION WHICH WAS UNTIMELY AND THEREFORE THE COURT 
DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE APPEAL. 
Standard of review: A party must file the notice of appeal "within 30 days after 
the date of entry of the Judgment or Order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). "If an 
appeal is not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal." Serrato v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,f7, 13 P.3d 616. Once this Court concludes that it lacks 
jurisdiction, it "retains only the jurisdiction to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. 
2 
Lamorcaux H*n P M 'M'^, ^ 7 ( M ' l l a l i < I ,- .p|<, l , |S" lM, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of ihv liatt hates oj ( mi Vrocniiuv >uues, m mcwim pan 
(2) If a party . . , fails to obe> an order to provide or permit discover} . the COUP 
which the action is pending max make such orders in reiiard to the failing .K n «n. t I 
among others the following , 
(v ) ai! oraer striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the 
order is obeyed, dismissing the action 01 proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a 
judgment by dM'-mIt sm'iinst ti^ <li\rK< •• -it ^artvf ' 
RULE 3 OF UTAH RULES OF APPEL! \ I F PR OCED1 TO * • 
how iaken.. 
1. a) Filing appeal from final orders .u.„juagmeaLv .n. uppcai iiia\ UL UKCH iwn, a 
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal 
from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law. bj h ig 
notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allow ed by Rule 
4) Failure of an Appellant to take any step other than the timeh filing of a nolhv 
of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground onlx for such 
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of 
the appeal or other sanctions ^hort ofMk'missa1 a<- M ,t]] "i the award of attorne> 
fees. 
t 4 ill l 1 \H RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. Appeal as of right: 
1) Appeai ironi final judgment and order. In a case in "which an appeal i> perm-" \\ 
as a matter of right from the trial court to the Appellate Court, the Notice of \y.y :\\ 
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the Trial Court nithin 30 days alter 
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from 
RULE 24 OF UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDUR l 
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The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to 
the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the 
Trial Court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A 
party challenging a Fact Finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. A party seeking to recover Attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall 
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
This is an appeal from a ruling, finding and Order (see Exhibit A) granting a 
Judgement striking the answer and awarding relief to the Appellee on a civil complaint 
for damages based on repossession of a motor vehicle. In the complaint, the Plaintiff, 
Victor Horrocks, obtained a short term loan in the amount of $650.00 for Al Title to pay 
off his college tuition at Salt Lake Community College, Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
compliant alleged the loan was taken out on May 5, 2001 and the Plaintiff, Victor 
Horrocks, was making payments as he was instructed by agents of the Defendant. The 
legal basis was generally the Utah Uniform Commercial Code and the claim that a vehicle 
was unlawfully repossessed from the Plaintiff Victor Horrock's residence at 874 West 
300 South without authority or Notice and in violation of the Security Agreement 
Disposition 
On November 24, 2003, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Order and a Final Judgement in favor the Appellee. No Notice of Appeal was filed 
within thirty days. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case was opened by the filing of a Complaint on May 10, 2002. 
2. On July 10, 2002, a Default Order was entered and a hearing was held on the 
amount of damages September 10, 2002 at which time the Appellee testified concerning 
damages in relation to the Judgement which had been previously entered. At that hearing 
the Court entered the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds with the value of additions and improvements and other 
items such as repairs to the transmission and new tires that the Jeep vehicle subject 
to this legal action was reasonable and fairly valued at $10,000,00. 
2. The Court finds based upon the testimony of Victor Horrocks 
concerning the fact that he has damages for inconvenience of loss of his vehicle, 
and to arrange alternative transportation for four(4) months after the vehicle was 
repossessed and sold at the commercially and unreasonably sale that $350.00 
payment is a reasonable amount to be awarded as damages per months. 
3. In light of the nature and aspect of the Appellees in repossession and 
sale of the vehicle in violation of Utah law, the other facts testified by the 
Appellees at the hearing, it is reasonable to allow loss of use to the Appellees until 
the Appellees could purchase a new vehicle. 
4. The sum of $350.00 per month which is equivalent to the cost per month 
of renting a similar vehicle and is a reasonable amount for the monthly loss of use 
caused by the loss of the vehicle for four (4) months. 
5. The Court finds that the five (5) hours at the hourly rate of $150.00 per hour are 
reasonable Attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
6. The Court finds that the damages, Attorney fees and costs proven at the hearing 
case as follows: 
a. For lost of the use of the Jeep vehicle $ 10,000.00 
b. For lost of the payment made on the Promissory Note $81.25 
c. For the four months lost of the use of the vehicle $1,400.00 
d. For inconvenience caused to the parties for four months $1,400.00 
until they could acquire a new vehicle. 
e. Total Attorney's fees and costs $915.00 
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f Total damages subject to Judgement $13.796.25 
3. On November 25, 2002, a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgement was filed 
by the Appellant setting forth the grounds to set aside the default based upon service. 
4. On February 14, 2002, the Court entered an Order setting aside the Default 
Judgement. 
5. Thereafter, on June 11, 2002, a Motion was filed for an Order compelling 
discovery and an attorney's fees and that Motion was submitted by Memorandum in 
support of the Motion. 
6. On June 23, 2003, the matter was submitted to the Court and at that time there 
had been no response filed by the Appellee. 
7. On July 9, 2003, the Court in a Minute Entry granted the Motion for an Order 
Compelling Discovery and Attorney's fees. 
8. The Appellant was ordered to respond to Discovery within twenty (20) days. 
9. The Appellee's attorney was awarded $300.00 in Attorney's fees. 
10. The Court specifically indicated in the Memorandum Decision that the 
Memorandum Decision served as a Court Order. In this situation the decision was 
imposed after a Motion was made to impose the sanction and the Appellant had an 
opportunity to respond, but failed to do so as required by the Court Order. 
11. On August 28, 2003, a Notice to Submit was submitted requesting an Order 
dismissing the Answer as a sanction for failing to respond to the Court Order of July 9, 
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2003. 
12. On September 15, 2003, the Court entered an Order dismissing the Answer and 
indicating the counsel for the Appellee was to prepare the Order, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
13. On October 14, 2003, the Appellant filed an Objection to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a request for hearing and oral argument. 
14. On October 20, 2003, the Appellee filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" and a 
Memorandum in Opposition. 
15. On November 4, 2003, the Appellee filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Appellant's Motion to Reconsider. 
16. On November 24, 2003, the Court entered an Order denying any objection to 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
17. On November 24, 2003, the Court entered an Order denying the objections to 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and overruling and denying the Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
18. On November 24, 2003, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, Order and a Final Judgement in favor the Plaintiff. The Court made findings 
that stated: 
1. In a July 9, 2003 Minute Entry decision, the Court ordered that 
outstanding Discovery be answered by the Appellant based upon the fact that 
there was no opposition to the Motion to Compel. Further, the Court ordered 
that Appellant's counsel was to contact Counsel for the Appellee to arrange a 
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mutually convenient time to meet regarding a discovery plan. 
2. Appellees' Motion to enter Order Dismissing the Answer and 
entering a Judgement against the Appellant stated in paragraph 4 that 
Appellees' counsel had not contacted Appellant' counsel as directed by the 
Court within the intervening period between the Minute Entry of July 9, 
2003. 
3. The Motion to strike the Appellant's Answer and enter a Default 
Judgment against the Appellant was supported by a Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities which were mailed to counsel for the Appellant on August 
7,2003. 
4. Thereafter, on August 22, 2003, as above-referenced, Counsel for 
the Appellees submitted a request for decision seeking a Judgment against 
the Defendant based upon grounds that the time for responding to the Motion 
having expired. 
5. The Appellant has filed an out-of-time Objection to Request for 
Decision and Notice of Compliance with Discovery Requests. 
6. The Court finds that the objection of the Appellant is clearly out-
of-time and was not filed within the proper time frame after receiving the 
Appellees' Motion. The document was mailed to Mr. Gaither, Attorney for 
the Appellees, on September 3, 2003, and filed with the Court on September 
2,2003. 
7. The Appellant states that the Discovery requests have been 
supplied to the Appellees, even though not brought to the Court's attention 
before the July 9, 2003, Minute Entry decision, and the Appellant claims that 
there has been compliance with the Appellee's Discovery requests. 
8. As to the Appellant's claims, the Court finds that nowhere in the 
responsive materials submitted by Counsel for the Appellant does the 
Appellant suggest why Appellant's counsel has chosen not to comply with 
the Court's directive that he contact Appellees' counsel to arrange for a 
Discovery and scheduling conference. 
9. The failure to contact Appellees' counsel by Appellant's counsel 
as required by this Court's Minute Entry of July 9, 2003, is the basis for the 
Appellees' Motion to Strike the Defendant's Answer and enter Judgment 
10. The Court finds that the out-of-time Objection filed by Counsel 
for the Appellant to the Motion to strike the Answer and enter Judgment and 
the fact that the Appellant has offered no excuse for not contacting 
Appellees' Counsel to arrange an attorney's meeting and prepare a Discovery 
Order both require this Court to grant the Motion submitted by the Appellees 
and to strike the Appellant's Answer. 
11. In this case, there have been numerous delays, primarily 
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occasioned by the Appellant, including the following. 
a. Initially, the Appellant's default was entered, but set aside 
on technical grounds relating to the manner of service. That occurred in 
February of 2003. 
b. Thereafter, nothing occurred in this case until the Appellees 
sought an Order compelling Discovery, to which the Appellant never filed a 
written opposition. 
c. The Court ruled on that Motion to Compel, as well as the 
failure of the Appellant to respond to the Appellees' request for Attorney's 
Scheduling Order, and entered its Minute Entry of July 9, 2003. That ruling 
not only required a response to the request for Discovery, which has 
apparently now been provided, but also required Appellant's counsel to 
contact Appellees' counsel for the purposes of engaging in an attorney's 
planning conference. That has not occurred, and no excuse has been offered 
as to why that has not occurred. 
19. On December 17, 2003, a Judgement was entered by the Court in favor of the 
Appellee against the Appellant. 
20. The Appellant did not file a Notice of Appeal within (30) days of the date of 
entry of the Order. 
21. On February 10, 2003, the Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgement. 
22. On April 5, 2004, the Court filed an Order and Minute Entry denying the 
Motion to Set Aside. 
23. On May 5, 2004, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Appellant has failed to marshal evidence on appeal to clearly show that the 
Trial Court abused its discretion in striking the answer after failing to arrange a meeting or 
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arrange a meeting as directed by Court Order. 
2. The Appellant, as a party to the action when the final Order striking the Answer 
and awarding relief to the Appellee, failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal and instead 
allowed the time for appeal to expire before filing a Rule 60B Motion. Therefore, the 
Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL 
TO CLEARLY SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING HIS CASE AFTER FAILING TO 
ARRANGE A MEETING OR ARRANGE A MEETING AS DIRECTED BY 
COURT ORDER. 
Initially, a default judgment was entered in favor of the Appellee after service. The 
Court allowed the Appellant to set aside the Default Judgments and the Motion was set 
aside. Thereafter, the Appellant answered and failed to comply with the Order as to the 
Discovery as specifically ordered by the Court in the Order when setting aside the default. 
In order to establish that a particular Finding of Fact is clearly erroneous, tf[a]n 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the Trial Court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against 
the clear weight of the evidence." In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
10 
If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this Court assumes that all findings are 
adequately supported by the evidence. In re Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d 1343,(Utah 1994). 
A party challenging a Fact Finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Here the Court made detailed and specific 
findings.(See attachment one hereto) 
After the Order was entered, the Appellant sought on three occasions to have the 
Court reconsider the striking of the Answer. There was a Judgement entered on Notice and 
after full briefing not on default. This was not a Default Judgement entered after failure to 
respond to service of process. The Trial Court heard the Appellant's excuses and denied 
the relief requested after making careful and detailed facts . 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in relevant part: 
(2) If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the Court in 
which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and 
among others the following:. . .; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the 
order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a 
judgment by default against the disobedient party[.] 
In Morton V. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 04/08/1997) the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court's dismissal of Morton's claims under Rule 
37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In Morton, the Court found the 
Appellant had not clearly shown that the Trial Court abused its discretion in dismissing 
the case. The Court stated: 
We have never expressed any rule which delineates a specific level of behavior 
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which must be met before rule 37 sanctions are warranted. As stated previously, a 
party's conduct merits sanctions under rule 37 if any of the following circumstances 
are found: (I) the party's behavior was willful; (2) the party has acted in bad faith; 
(3) the Court can attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the party has engaged in 
persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process. See Osguthorpe, 
892 P.2d at 6; Schamanek, 684 P.2d at 1266. 
To find that a party's behavior has been willful, there need only be " 'any intentional 
failure as distinguished from involuntary noncompliance.'" Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 
768 P.2d at 961 (quoting M.E.N. Co. v. Control Fluidics, Inc., 834 F.2d 869, 872-73 
(10th Cir. 1987)); see also Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 8. Morton presented to the Trial 
Court numerous excuses for failing to comply with the Court's Order in numerous 
Motions following the dismissal of his case. The Trial Court was not persuaded. 
Morton then presented the same arguments to the Court of Appeals, which found 
them to be "without merit." Morton presents the same excuses to this Court. 
However, Morton has not attacked the Court of Appeals' determination that such 
excuses were "without merit." On the other hand, because Morton knew that a 
Motion to Compel had been filed, which threatened dismissal of his case, and 
because all of the Motions and Orders were properly served on Morton, we think 
that there is ample evidence to support the view that Morton's failure to supply the 
Discovery requests in a timely manner was at least willful. 
The Court noted in Morton V. Continental Baking Co., that though dismissal of a 
noncomplying party's action is one of the most severe of the potential sanctions that can be 
imposed that it was within the range of the sanctions a Trial Judge can impose. Utah Dep't 
ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4(Utah 1995). In Morton, the Court indicated that 'it 
is clear from the language of Rule 37 that it is within a Trial Court's discretion to impose 
such a sanction." The Court stated: 
Because Trial Courts must deal first hand with the parties and the Discovery 
process, they are given broad discretion regarding the imposition of discovery 
sanctions.' " Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 6 (quoting Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 
457 (Utah.Ct.App. 1991)). Thus we have long held that we will not interfere unless 
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" 'abuse of that discretion [is] clearly shown.1" Id. at 8 (quoting Katz v. Pierce, 732 
P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986)); see also Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410, 412, 
16 Utah 2d 97, 100 (1964) ("Unless it is shown that [the Trial Court's] action is 
without support in the record, or is a plain abuse of discretion, it should not be 
disturbed."). We will find that a Trial Court has abused its discretion in choosing 
which sanction to impose only if there is either Man erroneous conclusion of law or . 
. . no evidentiary basis for the Trial Court's ruling." Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 
469, 472 
The Morton precedent was followed recently in Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75 
(Utah App. 03/16/2000). There the Court indicated that no finding of a "complete failure" 
to comply with Discovery is required and dismissal as a discovery sanction has been 
upheld for late or incomplete discovery responses. Citing W. W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. 
Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977) (affirming Default Judgment when 
Defendant failed to respond to Discovery although answers were tendered prior to sanction 
hearing) and, Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(affirming dismissal of Plaintiff s claim when Plaintiff failed to timely respond to 
Discovery requests but produced information at hearing). 
The Court stated in Hales v. Oldroyd, stated: 
The Court made the required preliminary findings of willfulness and dilatory 
behavior to support sanctions under Rule 37. Once the threshold finding is made, 
the choice of sanction is within the discretion of the Trial Court. We conclude the 
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Hales's complaint based on 
ample evidence in the record of her multiple delays and failures to respond to 
discovery requests and court orders. 
The Court of Appeals has indicated that because Trial Courts must deal first hand 
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with the parties and the discovery process, the Trial Judge is given broad discretion 
regarding the imposition of discovery sanctions. See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 37(d). 
Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc. 790 P.2d 584, 585-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The Rule 
37 discovery sanction has been found to be justified as the basis for the entry of default 
judgment and the circumstances in this matter is clearly not an abuse of discretion. See 
also, Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 312 (Utah.Ct.App. 1992). 
Although the Courts recognize that a party must be given an opportunity to be 
heard, the Utah Appellate Courts dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when a party 
pursues a claim in a manner that abuses that opportunity. The Trial Court here applied 
appropriate sanctions in light of the Appellees' continued refusal to comply with Orders of 
the Court after having a Default Judgment set aside. 
The Appellee submits that the Appellant did not meet the requirements of Rule 24 
(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure in the opening brief. This requires a 
party challenging Findings of Fact to marshal all evidence that supports the challenged 
findings. Instead of giving to the Trial Court or this Court specific reasons, the Appellant 
relied on general policy. In the case of Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84 indicated that in 
order to meet the marshaling requirements the Appellant must marshal all favorable 
evidence at the point in the Brief where there is a challenge of the Findings of Fact. Rule 
24 provides that the party challenging a Fact Finding must first marshal all record evidence 
that supports the challenge finding. In West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co. 818P.2d 1311 
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(Utah.Ct.App. 1991), the Utah Court indicated that in order to properly discharge the duty 
of marshaling the evidence the challenger must present comprehensive order all evidence 
which supports the findings that the Appellant resists. 
Therefore, in light of the failure to marshal evidence and to clearly show that there 
was a abuse of discretion, the Court should affirm the Trial Court's detailed findings and 
judgment. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT AS A PARTY TO THE ACTION WHEN THE FINAL ORDER 
STRIKING THE ANSWER AND AWARDING RELIEF TO THE PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL AND INSTEAD ALLOWED 
THE TIME FOR APPEAL TO EXPIRE BEFORE FILING A RULE 60B MOTION 
WHICH WAS UNTIMELY AND THEREFORE THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE APPEAL. 
On December 17, 2003, a Judgement was entered by the Court in favor of the 
Appellee against the Appellant.(see attachment 2) The Appellant did not file a Notice of 
Appeal within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of the Order. A Notice of Appeal from 
a final order or judgment is timely only if filed " within 30 days after the date of entry of 
judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
On February 10, 2003, the Appellant filed a "Motion to Set Aside Judgement". On 
April 5, 2004, the Court filed an Order and Minute Entry denying the Motion to Set Aside. 
On May 5, 2004, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. "[A]n appeal of a [r]ule 60(b) 
order addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. The appeal does not, at 
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least in most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was 
sought'" Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, (Utah 2000). 
The Appellant during the course of this litigation filed extensive Memorandums 
before the Judge on all of the issues and all of the points raised in the related Motion to Set 
Aside. The Appellant even objects to the Findings of Fact prior to judgment being entered. 
The Trial Court ruled and considered on the Motions and denied these same arguments on 
prior occasions. The Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Aside were filed after 
the time for a Notice to Appeal expired. 
In Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., the Court of Appeals stated: 
The judgment by default was a Final Judgment, i.e., one which puts 
an end to a lawsuit by declaring that the plaintiff is or is not entitled 
to recover the remedy sought. See Colder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 
922, 926 n.4 (Utah 1982); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 
969 (Utah App. 1989). Thus, Schoneyfs suit was concluded, unless relief 
could be obtained on appeal 
Therefore, the Motion was precluded by "law of the case." "The purpose of 
the doctrine of fthe law of the case* is that in the interest of economy of time and efficiency 
of procedure, it is desirable to avoid the delays and the difficulties involved in repetitious 
contentions and mlings upon the same proposition in the same case." Richardson v. Grand 
Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977) Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 
(Utah 1977) Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding.24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d 
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1 (1970) a party filed a motion to reconsider a Trial Court's order of judgment. The Court 
stated: "We are unaware of any such motion under our rules.... We think the motion to 
reconsider the motion to vacate the judgment is abortive under the rules...." See, Tracy v. 
University of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 3405 342 (Utah 1980) (rules of civil procedure make 
no provision for a motion to reconsider); see also Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 842-43 
(Utah 1980) (a party cannot extend the time for filing an appeal simply by filing a "motion 
for reconsideration of order striking petition and motion for relief from Final Judgment") 
The Appellee submits that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide 
for a Court to re-open or reconsider a judgment which was fully submitted and ruled upon 
the Court when appeal was waived. The Appellant waived the filing of an appeal to the 
appropriate Court because there was no factual or legal basis to set aside a matter which 
the Judge denied the request to "reconsider". 
In Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 842-43 (Utah 1980) the Appellate Court indicated 
that the time for taking an appeal simply by filing a "motion for reconsideration of order 
striking petition and motion for relief from final judgment"). In Utah State Employees 
Credit Union v. Riding 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1 (1970), a party filed a motion to 
reconsider a trial court's order of judgment. The Court stated: "We are unaware of any such 
motion under our rules.... We think the motion to reconsider the motion to vacate the 
judgment is abortive under the rules...." See, Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 
340, 342 (Utah 1980) (Rules of Civil Procedure make no provision for a Motion to 
17 
Reconsider). 
The Appellant has not filed any Notice of Appeal and therefore the Judgement is 
final. The Court should dismiss the appeal and award an Order for Attorney's fees 
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Appellate Rules of Procedure for pursing an Appeal without 
jurisdiction. In determining to enter such award, the Court should take into account the 
fact that the lower Court awarded a Judgement which included post judgment continuing 
attorney fees in this matter. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The Appellee requests that the Court find that there is no jurisdiction for this appeal. 
In the alternative, the Appellee requests this Court sustain the ruling of the District Court 
in these proceedings and dismiss the appeal. 
DATED this / day of November 2004 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the / day of November, 2004 a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF was mailed First Class, postage prepaid to: 
ROBERT D. ROSE 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
6364 SOUTH HIGHLAND, SUITE 203 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84121 
DATED this _V_ day of November, 2004. 
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RANDALL GAITHER #1141 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
159 West 300 South Broadway #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
HLED DISTRICT COUJff 
Third Judwai District 
NOV 1 h 2003 
\& SALT LAI^OUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
ELEANOR ULIBARRI and ] 
VICTOR HORROCKS, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
A-QUICK TITLE LOANS, INC., ] 
Defendant. ] 
I FINDINGS OF FACT 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
) ORDER ' 
i Judge: HANSEN 
> Civil No. 020904009 
Based upon the Minute Entry entered by the Court and signed on September 15, 
2003, the pleadings on file, the Court hereby enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In a July 9, 2003 Minute Entry decision, the Court ordered that outstanding 
discovery be answered by the Defendant based upon the fact that there was no opposition 
to the Motion to Compel. Further the Court ordered that defendant's counsel was to 
contact counsel for the plaintiffs to arrange a mutually convenient time to meet regarding 
a discovery plan. 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion to enter Order Dismissing the Answer and entering a 
judgement against the Defendant stated in paragraph 4 that Defendant's counsel had not 
contacted plaintiffs' counsel as directed by the Court within the intervening period 
between the Minute Entry of July 9, 2003. 
3. The Motion to strike the Defendant's Answer and enter a Default Judgment 
against the Defendant was supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities which 
were mailed to counsel for the Defendant on August 7, 2003. 
4. Thereafter, on August 22, 2003, as above-referenced, Counsel for the Plaintiffs 
submitted a request for decision seeking a Judgment against the Defendant based upon 
grounds that the time for responding to the Motion having expired, 
5. The Defendant has filed an out-of-time Objection to Request for Decision and 
Notice of Compliance with Discovery Requests. 
6. The Court finds that the Objection of the Defendant is clearly out-of-time and 
was not filed within the proper time frame after receiving the Plaintiffs Motion. The 
document was mailed to Mr. Gaither, attorney for the Plaintiffs, on September 3, 2003 
and filed with the Court on September 2, 2003. 
7. The Defendant states that the discovery requests have been supplied to the 
Plaintiffs, even though not brought to the Court's attention before the July 9,2003, 
Minute Entry decision, and the Defendant claims that there has been compliance with the 
Plaintiffs discovery requests. 
8. As to the Defendants claims, the Court finds that nowhere in the responsive 
materials submitted by Counsel for the Defendant does the Defendant suggest why 
defendant's counsel has chosen not to comply with the Court's directive that he contact 
Plaintiffs's Counsel to arrange for a discovery and scheduling conference. 
9. The failure to contact Plaintiffs' Counsel by Defendant's Counsels required by 
this Court's Minute Entry of July 9, 2003, is the basis for the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
the Defendant's Answer and enter Judgment 
10. The Court finds that the out-of-time Objection filed by Counsel for the 
Defendant to the Motion to strike the Answer and enter Judgment and the fact that the 
Defendant has offered no excuse for not contacting Plaintiffs' Counsel to arrange an 
attorney's meeting and prepare a discovery Order both require this Court to grant the 
Motion submitted by the Plaintiffs and to strike the Defendant's Answer. 
11. In this case, there have been numerous delays, primarily occasioned by the 
Defendant, including the following. 
a. Initially, the Defendant's default was entered, but set aside on technical 
grounds relating to the manner of service. That occurred in February of 2003. 
b. Thereafter, nothing occurred in this case until the plaintiffs sought an 
Order compelling discovery, to which the Defendant never filed a written opposition. 
c. The Court ruled on that Motion to Compel, as well as the failure of the 
defendant to respond to the plaintiffs' request for attorney's scheduling Order, and 
entered its Minute Entry of July 9, 2003. That ruling required not only a response to the 
request for discovery, which has apparently now been provided, but also required 
defendant's counsel to contact plaintiffs counsel for the purposes of engaging in an 
attorney's planning conference. That has not occurred, and no excuse has been offered as 
to why that has not occurred. 
12. Failure to comply fully with discovery is in direct violation of this Court's 
Minute Entry order of July 9, 2003. 
13. A hearing was held before the Court based upon a previously entered Default 
Judgement on September 10, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. before the Court where witnesses and 
documents were introduced as evidence. 
14. The Court finds with the value of additions and improvements and other items 
such as repairs to the transmission and new tires that the Jeep vehicle subject to this legal 
action was reasonable and fairly valued at $10,000.00. 
15. The Court finds based upon the testimony of the Plaintiff Victor Horrocks 
concerning the fact that he has damages for inconvenience for loss of his vehicle and to 
arrange alternative transportation for four months after the vehicle was repossessed and 
sold at the commercially and unreasonably sale that $350.00 payment is a reasonable 
amount to be awarded as damages per months. 
16. In light of the nature and aspect of the Plaintiffs in repossession and sale of the 
vehicle in violation of Utah law, the other facts testified by the Plaintiff at the hearing, it 
is reasonable to allow loss of use to the Plaintiffs until the Plaintiffs could purchase a new 
vehicle. 
17. The sum of $350.00 per month which is equivalent to the cost per month of 
renting a similar vehicle and is a reasonable amount for the monthly loss of use caused by 
the loss of the vehicle for four months. 
18. The Court finds that the hourly rate of $ 150.00 per hour in this matter as for 
Attorney's fees is reasonable and a factual basis to award attorney fees to counsel for the 
Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
19. A factual basis exists to enter sanctions for violation of Court Orders in relation 
to discovery and also pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedures Rule 37 Xo grant the relief 
requested by the Plaintiff against the Defendant including striking of the Answer and entry 
of the prior Judgement which was entered by the Court after an Evidentiary Hearing. 
20. The Court finds that the damages, Attorney fees and costs proven at the earlier 
hearing case as follows: 
a. For lost of the use of the Jeep vehicle $ 10,000.00 
b. For lost of the payment made on the Promissory Note $81.25 
c. For the four months lost of the use of the vehicle $ 1,400.00 
d. For inconvenience caused to the parties for four months $1,400.00. 
until they could acquire a new vehicle 
e. Total attorney fees and costs $915.00 
f. Total damages subject to Judgement $13/796.25 
ORDER 
21. The Court hereby grants the Motion of the Plaintiff to strike the Answer 
previously submitted and Judgement shall be entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant in accordance with the prior Judgement which was entered after a hearing and 
testimony of witnesses and exhibits were considered by the Court. 
22. The Judgement will provide for additional attorney fees incurred to enforce the 
July 9, 2003 Minute Entry. 
DATED this &tf day of/ 7 j j ^ 2003. 
JDGE TIMOTHY HANSe^ll^X 
DISTRICT COURT j U D Q ^ f r h)« 
MAILING CERTIFK 
^ViO *2/' 
I hereby certify that on the ( y day of November, 2003, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER was mailed to: 
NATHAN DRAGE 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
4766 SOUTH HOLLIDAY ROAD 
HOLLIDAY, UTAH 84117 
DATED this i£» ay of November, 2003 
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RANDALL GAITHER #1141 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
159 West 300 South Broadway #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
wovnifo/IAGEEp 
^SALTLAK^OUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
ELEANOR ULIBARRI and 
VICTOR HORROCKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
A-QUICK TITLE LOANS, INC., 
Defendant. 
JUDGEMENT 
DATE 
Judge: HANSEN 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMEN/TS l//>T/»> 
Civil No. 020904009 
Based upon the Minute Entry of the Court dated August 22,2003, the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law entered by the Court in addition to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law previously on record and good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiffs are jointly awarded 
a Judgement in the amount of $13,796.25 against the Defendant A-Quick Title Loans, Inc. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that attorney fees in the amount of 
three hundred ($300.00) which were incurred after July 9, 2003 to the date of Judgement in 
this matter as and for attorney fees is awarded in favor of the Plaintiffs against the Defendant, 
A-Quick Title Loans, Inc. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff is entitled 
reasonable attorney fees incurred after the date of the hearing for collection on the judgement 
and the Plaintiffs may apply to the Court pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
pursuant to the Utah Code of Judicial Administration for supplemental attorney fees. 
DATED this day of , 2003. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the '?£> day of Ocjioeer, 2003, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing JUDGEMENT was mailed to: 
NATHAN DRAGE 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
4766 SOUTH HOLLIDAY ROAD 
HOLLIDAY, UTAH 84117 
DATED this <$> day of Octi 003. 
,ftK>OWA ^jvW—C 
III. MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
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Nathan W. Drage #5194 
Nathan W. Drage, PC. 
4766 Holladay Blvd. 
Holladay, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 801-273-9300 
Facsimile: 801-273-9314 
Attorney for Defendant 
KfCT COLii I 
UH FEB 10 AM 8-* 37 
# VfiiHls -^itfCIAL QIST8CT, 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
ELEANOR ULIBARRI and VICTOR 
HORROCKS 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
A-QUICK TITLE LOANS, INC. 
Defendant. 
RULE 60(b) 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT 
Civil NO. 020904009 
Judge Hanson 
Defendant, through his attorney, respectfully moves this Court to set aside the 
judgment rendered in this matter on November 24,2003 pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and 
(6). 
This motion is supported by the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
and the Affidavit of Nathan W. Drage. 
Dated thig$^day of January, 2004. 
Jathan w. Drage 
Attorney for Defendant 
